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Welcome Home: Aboriginal Rights Law after Desautel
Abstract
In R. v. Desautel, decided 23 April 2021, a majority of the Supreme Court of Canada held, for the first time,
that an Indigenous community located in the United States, whose members are neither citizens nor
residents of Canada, can have an existing Aboriginal right, protected by section 35 of the Constitution Act,
1982, to hunt in a specified area within Canada. This will be so, the Supreme Court majority held, where
the community can show that it descends from (is a successor of) an Indigenous community that was
present in what is now Canada at the time of the ancestral community’s first contact with Europeans, and
that hunting in the relevant part of Canada was integral to its way of life at that time. Justices Côté and
Moldaver dissented. This article analyzes the majority decision, comments on the dissenting judgments,
and delves into some unresolved issues that will need attention in light of the decision. They include the
status of common law Aboriginal rights, the notion of sovereign incompatibility, the optimal way of
litigating claims of Aboriginal right, and the impact of the decision on Aboriginal title claims and the duty
to consult.
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the first time, that an Indigenous community located in the United States, whose members
are neither citizens nor residents of Canada, can have an existing Aboriginal right, protected
by section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, to hunt in a specified area within Canada. This will
be so, the Supreme Court majority held, where the community can show that it descends
from (is a successor of) an Indigenous community that was present in what is now Canada
at the time of the ancestral community’s first contact with Europeans, and that hunting in
the relevant part of Canada was integral to its way of life at that time. Justices Côté and
Moldaver dissented. This article analyzes the majority decision, comments on the dissenting
judgments, and delves into some unresolved issues that will need attention in light of the
decision. They include the status of common law Aboriginal rights, the notion of sovereign
incompatibility, the optimal way of litigating claims of Aboriginal right, and the impact of the
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RICHARD LEE DESAUTEL, AN AMERICAN CITIZEN, is a member of the Lakes
Tribe, one of the Colville Confederated Tribes (CCT). He resides with other
members of the Lakes Tribe on the Colville Indian Reservation in the state of
Washington. He has never lived in Canada.
Te Lakes Tribe traces its ancestry to an Indigenous group usually called
the Sinixt, whose traditional territory straddles the Canada/United States
border from south-central British Columbia to Kettle Falls in Washington State.
In 2010, Mr. Desautel, acting on instructions from the CCT’s Fish and Wildlife
Director, entered British Columbia legally and shot an elk within traditional
Sinixt territory near Castlegar, British Columbia, to secure ceremonial meat
for his community. He reported the kill to the BC wildlife authorities. He was
charged with two violations under BC’s Wildlife Act: hunting without a licence
and hunting big game without a guide while a non-resident.1 At trial, he admitted
the essential elements of the ofences but asserted an existing Sinixt Aboriginal
right to hunt for food and ceremonial purposes within traditional Sinixt territory
in British Columbia. Te two relevant ofence provisions, he argued, infringe
that right unjustifably.
Te trial judge concluded that hunting within traditional Sinixt territory for
those purposes in what is now British Columbia was integral to the distinctive
Sinixt way of life at and before their frst contact with Europeans in 1811, and
that the Lakes Tribe is a successor group to the ancestral Sinixt.2 Ordinarily, this
would sufce to establish an existing Aboriginal right, recognized and afrmed
by section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, that would protect Lakes Tribe

1.
2.

RSBC 1996, c 488, ss 11(1), 47(a).
R v DeSautel, 2017 BCPC 84 at para 84, 68, respectively [DeSautel (BCPC)].
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members hunting within that territory.3 Te Crown had argued, however, that
section 35 gave the Lakes Tribe no constitutional protection because it guaranteed
only “the existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada”
and the Lakes Tribe, residing outside Canada, could not qualify as “aboriginal
peoples of Canada.”4 In the alternative, the Crown submitted, no Aboriginal right
could protect Sinixt hunting in their traditional territory within British Columbia
because there was no evidence that any of them had hunted there between 1930
and 2010, the year Mr. Desautel shot the elk. Finally, the Crown argued in the
further alternative, any Aboriginal right that the Lakes Tribe might have would
necessarily include an incidental right to cross the international border for
hunting purposes. No such right could exist, the argument ran, because it would
be incompatible with Canada’s power to control and defend the international
border, an essential attribute of Crown sovereignty.5
At trial, Judge Mrozinski rejected these arguments. In her view, an Indigenous
group that resided and engaged in integral harvesting practices in what is now
British Columbia at the time of frst contact with Europeans is entitled to the
protection of section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. Sinixt ancestors of the
present-day Lakes Tribe had indeed migrated into the southern (American) part
of their traditional territory in sufcient numbers to achieve recognition as a
tribe under American law by 1872, but their exodus was not voluntary; “it was a
matter of making the best choice out of a number of bad choices.”6 Moreover, the
absence of evidence that Lakes Tribe members had hunted in British Columbia
after 1930 was not fatal to Mr. Desautel’s claim to an Aboriginal right.7 Finally,
she observed, it was not necessary to consider the “sovereign incompatibility”
issue because Mr. Desautel had entered Canada legally, without incident, and was
not claiming an Aboriginal right to cross the international border.8 Mr. Desautel
and the Lakes Tribe, she held, have, therefore, an existing Aboriginal right to
hunt for food and ceremony in traditional Sinixt territory in British Columbia.
Te ofence provisions with which he was charged infringed that right, and the
Crown had failed to justify the infringement. Mr. Desautel was acquitted.9

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

See especially R v Van der Peet, [1996] 2 SCR 507 at paras 44-46, 55-59 [Van der Peet].
Constitution Act, 1982, s 35(1), being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982,
c 11 [emphasis added].
DeSautel (BCPC), supra note 2 at para 5-6.
Ibid at para 128.
Ibid at paras 128-35.
Ibid at paras 136-67.
Ibid at paras 168-85.
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On appeal, the Supreme Court of British Columbia agreed.10 So, on further
appeal, did the Court of Appeal for British Columbia.11 On 23 April 2021, the
Supreme Court of Canada (SCC), in a 7-2 decision (Justices Côté and Moldaver
dissenting), dismissed the Crown’s fnal appeal.12 According to Justice Rowe, who
wrote for the majority, the Crown was correct to insist that only an Indigenous
group that qualifes as an “aboriginal people of Canada” is entitled to the protection
of section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.13 But “Aboriginal peoples of Canada
under s. 35(1),” the Court held, “are the modern-day successors of Aboriginal
societies that occupied what is now Canada at the time of European contact.”14
On the fndings of the trial judge, the Lakes Tribe meets this requirement.15 Tis,
and the further fnding that hunting for food and ceremony within south-central
British Columbia was integral to the ancestral Sinixt way of life at the time of
contact, sufced, in the Court’s view, to establish the Lakes Tribe’s entitlement
to an Aboriginal right to do so today.16 Te Court thought the border issue,
along with several other issues that the Crown and other attorneys general had
raised in their SCC submissions (the Crown’s duty to consult, the common law
status of Aboriginal rights, and provisions in modern treaties about non-resident
Indigenous peoples, among others) could await resolution in subsequent cases in
which the facts required decisions about them.
In this article, we discuss the Court’s reasons for the conclusions it reached
and some of the issues that now will require attention in the wake of Desautel—
issues that Justice Rowe identifed but deferred.

I. INTERPRETATION OF “ABORIGINAL PEOPLES OF
CANADA”
Te main issue at the SCC was the proper interpretation of “aboriginal peoples
of Canada” in section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. Section 35(1) provides
that “[t]he existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada
are hereby recognized and afrmed.”17 Te majority and dissenting judgments
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

R v Desautel, 2017 BCSC 2389 [Desautel (BCSC)].
R v Desautel, 2019 BCCA 151 [Desautel (BCCA)].
R v Desautel, 2021 SCC 17 at para 22 [Desautel].
Ibid at para 20.
Ibid at para 47. Justice Rowe acknowledged expressly that “this criterion will need to be
modifed in the case of the Métis” but left that modifcation for another day (ibid at para 32).
15. Ibid at para 48.
16. See ibid at para 62.
17. Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 4, s 35(1).
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agreed that the framers of section 35 never considered whether Indigenous
groups residing outside Canada could be “aboriginal peoples of Canada,” but
difered sharply in their approaches to this issue.18
Justice Rowe applied the purposive approach to interpretation of section
35(1) articulated in previous cases, especially R. v. Van der Peet (“Van Der Peet”):19
[T]he two purposes of s. 35(1) are to recognize the prior occupation of Canada
by organized, autonomous societies and to reconcile their modern-day existence
with the Crown’s assertion of sovereignty over them. Tese purposes are refected
in the structure of Aboriginal rights and title doctrine, which frst looks back to the
practices of groups that occupied Canadian territory prior to European contact,
sovereignty or efective control, and then expresses those practices as constitutional
rights held by modern-day successor groups within the Canadian legal order.20

Aboriginal rights (apart from title and Métis rights),21 including the hunting right
at issue in Desautel, are based on the practices, customs, and traditions integral
to distinctive Indigenous cultures at the time of contact with Europeans.22 Tese
rights, therefore, relate back to Indigenous peoples’ pre-colonial use of land and
resources in their ancestral territories in accordance with their own practices and
laws. From this, Justice Rowe concluded, rightly in our opinion, that “the scope
of ‘aboriginal peoples of Canada’ is clear: it must mean the modern-day successors
of Aboriginal societies that occupied Canadian territory at the time of European
contact. As a result, groups whose members are neither citizens nor residents of
Canada can be Aboriginal peoples of Canada.”23 Members of the Lakes Tribe
of Sinixt people living in Washington State, including Mr. Desautel, therefore,
could have constitutionally-protected rights in their ancestral territory in Canada.
Justice Côté dissented on this issue. She considered the majority’s
understanding of the meaning of “aboriginal peoples of Canada”
contrary to a purposive analysis of s. 35(1) that examines the linguistic, philosophic,
and historical contexts of that provision. Tis Court’s s. 35(1) jurisprudence has
characterized—properly, in my view—reconciliation in terms of the relationship

18.
19.
20.
21.

See Desautel, supra note 12 at para 41, Rowe J; ibid at paras 115, 119, Côté J, dissenting.
Supra note 3.
Desautel, supra note 12 at para 22.
Aboriginal title is based on exclusive occupation of land at the time of Crown assertion of
sovereignty. See Delgamuukw v British Columbia, [1997] 3 SCR 1010 [Delgamuukw]. Métis
Aboriginal rights, apart from title (the test for which has not been determined by the Court),
are based on Métis practices, customs, and traditions at the time of efective European
control. See R v Powley, [2003] 2 SCR 207.
22. Van der Peet, supra note 3.
23. Desautel, supra note 12 at para 23.
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between non-Aboriginal Canadians and Aboriginal peoples as full and equal
members of, and participants in, Canadian society.24

In her opinion, the drafters of section 35 could not possibly have intended the
provision to include non-resident Indigenous groups.25
Justice Côté thus considered reconciliation apposite only to the segments
of Indigenous nations that happened to end up and stay in Canada after Britain
and the United States drew their international border in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries.26 Tese colonial actions bifurcated many Indigenous
nations, taking no account of their presence on and relationship with their
traditional territories. Justice Côté’s view would perpetuate these adverse efects,
leaving the Indigenous members of these nations who reside in the United States
separated from their homelands and relatives in Canada. Tis would hardly serve
the interests of reconciliation. Justice Rowe’s approach, on the other hand, does
promote reconciliation precisely because it takes account of the disruptive efects
of these insensitive and disrespectful colonial initiatives. It is a step towards
righting that earlier injustice.

II. THE VAN DER PEET INTEGRAL TO THE DISTINCTIVE
CULTURE TEST AND CONTINUITY
Establishing that the Sinixt are an Aboriginal people of Canada was a threshold
requirement for the majority of the SCC. In addition, for Mr. Desautel to have
an Aboriginal right to hunt for food, social, and ceremonial purposes in their
ancestral territory in Canada, such hunting had to be integral to pre-contact
Sinixt culture, as required by the test created in the Van der Peet case in 1996.27
Justice Rowe said that the test for groups outside Canada is the same as for groups
within Canada and decided that the trial judge had applied the test correctly in
determining that the Sinixt People have a right to hunt in their ancestral territory
24. Ibid at para 94.
25. See ibid at paras 115-25. Justice Moldaver, in a brief separate dissent, was prepared to
assume, without deciding, that the majority’s understanding of “aboriginal peoples of
Canada” was sound. He dissented on other grounds, discussed below. See ibid at para 143.
26. Tis was done when neither Britain nor the United States actually occupied or exercised
authority over most of the territory crossed by these borderlines. On creation of the border
by bilateral international treaties in 1783, 1818, and 1846, see Bruce Hutchison, Te Struggle
for the Border (Longmans, Green & Co, 1955); Norman L Nicholson, Te Boundaries of the
Canadian Confederation (Macmillan of Canada, 1979); Donald A Rakestraw, For Honour or
Destiny: Te Anglo-American Crisis over the Oregon Territory (Peter Lang, 1995).
27. Supra note 3 at paras 44-46.
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in Canada.28 However, he had more to say about the continuity that is required
between the historical practice, custom, and tradition and the modern practice
that is alleged to be protected as an Aboriginal right, as both Justice Côté and
Justice Moldaver dissented on this matter.
Continuity in this sense requires only that the modern practice be sufciently
like the historical practice to fall within the scope of the right arising from the
practice, custom, or tradition at the time of contact.29 But the dissenting judges
thought that the continuity requirement also necessitates a degree of maintenance
of the practice over the intervening time period. Justice Côté, Justice Moldaver
concurring on this issue, opined that, “while temporal gaps in the actual practice
do not necessarily preclude the establishment of an Aboriginal right (Van der
Peet, at para. 65), failing to tender sufcient evidence that the practice was
maintained or, at least, that a connection to the historical practice was maintained
during such gaps may be fatal.”30 She emphasized the absence in the factual
record of any evidence that the Lakes Tribe had hunted in Canada between 1930
and 2010, when Mr. Desautel shot the elk. In her view, “[c]ontinuity cannot be
established simply because there is evidence that ‘the land was not forgotten’ in
the minds of the Lakes Tribe members…. A single shot cannot create the Lakes
Tribe’s modern exercise of the right.”31
Te majority understood continuity diferently. In one sense, Justice Rowe
said it can have a role in proof. Evidence that
a practice is integral to the claimant’s culture today, and that it has continuity with
pre-contact times, can count as proof that the practice was integral to the claimant’s
culture pre-contact…. As Kent McNeil explains, “continuity of this sort has to
be shown only when Aboriginal peoples rely on post-sovereignty occupation or
post-contact practices, customs, and traditions as evidence of their pre-sovereignty
occupation or pre-contact practices, customs, and traditions.”32

Another use of the concept of continuity is in the determination of
whether the modern practice which is claimed to be an exercise of an Aboriginal
right is connected to, and reasonably seen as a continuation of, the pre-contact
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Desautel, supra note 12 at paras 50, 61.
See R v Marshall; R v Bernard, 2005 SCC 43 at para 67 [Marshall/Bernard].
Desautel, supra note 12 at para 130.
Ibid at paras 136-37.
Ibid at para 53, citing Kent McNeil, “Continuity of Aboriginal Rights” in Kerry Wilkins,
ed, Advancing Aboriginal Claims: Visions/Strategies/Directions (Purich, 2004) 127 at 138.
For other authorities relied on by the Court, see Van der Peet, supra note 3 at paras 62-63;
R v Gladstone, [1996] 2 SCR 723 at para 28 [Gladstone]; Delgamuukw, supra note 21 at para
152; Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia, 2014 SCC 44 at para 45 [Tsilhqot’in Nation].
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practice. At this stage, continuity with the pre-contact practice is required in order
for the claimed activity to fall within the scope of the right. It serves to avoid frozen
rights, allowing the practice to evolve into modern forms…. Te right claimed
“must be allowed to evolve”, because “[i]f aboriginal rights are not permitted to
evolve and take modern forms, then they will become utterly useless.”33

Unlike the dissenting justices, who were concerned about the temporal aspect of
continuity, the emphasis of the majority was thus on the use of the concept to
determine the scope of the contemporary right and the need to include modern
ways of exercising it.
Te Crown argued that “continuity requires an ongoing presence in the lands
over which an Aboriginal right is asserted.”34 Justice Rowe responded as follows:
As my discussion of continuity should make clear, this has never been part of the
test for an Aboriginal right. Nor is there any basis for adding it to the test, even
where the claimant is outside Canada. As Lamer C.J. explained in Van der Peet, at
para. 65, “an unbroken chain of continuity” is not required. Indeed, as McLachlin
J. (dissenting, but not on this point) noted in Van der Peet, at para. 249, “it is not
unusual for the exercise of a right to lapse for a period of time.”35

Justice Rowe’s position on this is consistent with common law principles. Legal
rights, once acquired, are not lost through non-use.36 In Re Yateley Common,
Hampshire, Justice Foster said this in regard to a customary right to a common:
A right of common is a legal right, and it is exceedingly difcult to prove that a
person having such a legal right has abandoned it. Non-user, if the owner of the
right has no reason to exercise it, requires something more than an immense length
33. Desautel, supra note 12 at para 54, citing R v Sappier; R v Gray, 2006 SCC 54 at paras 48-49
[Sappier/Gray]. Cited as well, on the evolution of practices into modern forms, are Van der
Peet, supra note 3 at para 64; Mitchell v MNR, 2001 SCC 33 at para 13 [Mitchell].
34. Desautel, supra note 12 at para 63.
35. Ibid. See also R v Marshall, 2003 NSCA 105 at paras 157-81. Cromwell JA (later on the
SCC), after detailed discussion of relevant case law, concluded that Aboriginal title, once
established at the time of Crown assertion of sovereignty, continues without any need to
prove occupation from sovereignty to the present. Tis decision was overturned on appeal
without consideration of this issue because the SCC found, on the facts, that Aboriginal title
had not been established. See Marshall/Bernard, supra note 29.
36. But see the discriminatory and rightly criticized judgment of the High Court of Australia in
Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria, [2002] HCA 58. Additionally,
see Richard Bartlett, “An Obsession with Traditional Laws and Customs Creates Difculty
Establishing Native Title Claims in the South: Yorta Yorta” (2003) 31 UWA L Rev 35;
Kirsten Anker, “Law in the Present Tense: Tradition and Cultural Continuity in Members of
the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria” (2004) 28 Melbourne UL Rev 1; Simon
Young, Te Trouble with Tradition: Native Title and Cultural Change (Federation Press, 2008)
at 317-34, 406-14.
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of time of non-user. It is essential that it is proved to the court’s satisfaction that the
owner of the legal right has abandoned the right – in the sense that he not only has
not used it but intends never to use it again. Te onus lies fairly and squarely on
those who assert that the right has been abandoned.37

Similarly, in Tehidy Minerals Ltd. v. Norman, Lord Justice Buckley held that
“[a]bandonment of an easement or of a proft à prendre can only, we think,
be treated as having taken place where the person entitled to it has demonstrated
a fxed intention never at any time thereafter to assert the right himself or to
attempt to transmit it to anyone else.”38 Lord Denning MR, in Wyld v Silver,
likewise rejected the notion that a customary right to hold a fair could be
lost by non-user:
I know of no way in which the inhabitants of a parish can lose a right of this kind
once they have acquired it except by Act of Parliament. Mere disuse will not do. And
I do not see how they can waive it or abandon it. No one or more of the inhabitants
can waive or abandon it on behalf of the others. Nor can all the present inhabitants
waive or abandon it on behalf of future generations.39

Lord Denning’s judgment is particularly relevant to Aboriginal rights because, like
customary rights in England, they are held by groups rather than individuals for
the beneft of future generations, as well as current members.40 What justifcation,
one might ask, could there possibly be for treating the constitutional rights of the
Aboriginal peoples of Canada less favourably than customary rights are treated in
England by the common law?
In Desautel, Justice Rowe observed that
[i]n efect, we are asked [by the Crown] to hold that an Aboriginal right can be
lost or abandoned by non-use: a proposition that Lamer C.J. left undecided in Van
der Peet, at para. 63. Would accepting this proposition risk ‘undermining the very
37. [1977] 1 All ER 505 at 510 (Ch).
38. [1971] 2 QB 528 at 553 (CA). See also Ward v Ward (1852), 7 Ex 838 at 839; Gotobed v
Pridmore (1970), [1971] 115 Sol Jo 78 (CA).
39. [1963] 1 Ch 243 at 255-56 (CA). See also Scales v Key (1840), 11 Ad & E 819 at 825-26
(QB) (where Lord Chief Justice Denman observed that the jury’s fnding, “that the custom
had existed till 1689, was the same in efect as if they had found that it had existed till last
week, unless something appeared to shew that it had been legally abolished”). See also Heath
v Deane, [1905] 2 Ch 86 at 93-94; New Windsor Corporation v Mellor, [1975] 3 All ER 44 at
50-51 (Lord Denning MR), 53 (Browne LJ).
40. In Re Tucktoo and Kitchooalik (1972), 27 DLR (3d) 225 (NWT TC), af’d (1972), 28 DLR
(3d) 483 (NWT CA), Territorial Court Justice Morrow held that the rule that customs
can be abolished only by statute applies to Inuit customs relating to adoption, and that the
legislation would have to be either repugnant to those customs, or directly or by implication
intended to abolish them.
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purpose of s. 35(1) by perpetuating the historical injustice sufered by aboriginal
peoples at the hands of colonizers’?”41

He then stated that “It is better not to decide the issue here, as it does not arise
in light of the factual fndings of the trial judge.”42 Tis was an odd thing for him
to say, given that the evidence did not reveal any Sinixt hunting in Canada from
1930 to 2010, and that the Crown argued that the right to hunt had been lost as
a result. In efect, Justice Rowe did decide that non-use of the right for 80 years
did not cause it to be lost.
Justice Rowe’s reference to Chief Justice Lamer’s statement in R v Côté
(“Côté”)—that courts should avoid adopting propositions that would perpetuate
historical injustice—is signifcant. Tat statement was made in the context of
the Crown’s argument in Côté that French law in Canada prior to the transfer of
New France to Britain in 1763 did not acknowledge Aboriginal rights. Te SCC
decided that the Crown’s position, if correct,
would create an awkward patchwork of constitutional protection for aboriginal
rights across the nation, depending upon the historical idiosyncrasies of
colonization over particular regions of the country. In my respectful view, such a
static and retrospective interpretation of s. 35(1) cannot be reconciled with the
noble and prospective purpose of the constitutional entrenchment of aboriginal
and treaty rights in the Constitution Act, 1982. Indeed, the respondent’s proposed
interpretation risks undermining the very purpose of s. 35(1) by perpetuating the
historical injustice sufered by aboriginal peoples at the hands of colonizers who
failed to respect the distinctive cultures of pre-existing aboriginal societies.43

For the Sinixt, colonization had a series of negative impacts, starting with
smallpox epidemics.44 In 1846, the creation of the international boundary by
the Oregon Boundary Treaty split their ancestral territory in two. In 1896,
the BC Game Protection Amendment Act made it unlawful for them to hunt in
British Columbia,45 so they would have had to do so surreptitiously. Justice Rowe
noted, “Te trial judge did not fnd that the Sinixt were forced out of Canada ‘at
gunpoint’ (para. 101), but nor did she fnd that the move was voluntary, as the
Lakes Tribe never gave up their claim to their traditional territory in Canada.”46

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Supra note 12 at para 64, citing R v Côté, [1996] 3 SCR 139 at para 53 [Côté].
Desautel, supra note 12 at para 64.
Côté, supra note 41 at para 53.
DeSautel (BCPC), supra note 2 at paras 15-18.
SBC 1896, c 22, s 6 (“It shall be unlawful for Indians not resident of this Province to kill
game at any time of the year”). See also Desautel, supra note 12 at para 5.
46. Desautel, supra note 12 at para 5.
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Te notion that any Indigenous people would have voluntarily abandoned their
homeland in the face of colonization strains credulity.47
In case there was doubt on the issue before, the correct position on continuity
is that sustained use (or occupation in the case of Aboriginal title) is not required
to maintain Aboriginal rights based on practices, customs, and traditions at the
time of contact (or Aboriginal title based on exclusive occupation at the time of
Crown assertion of sovereignty).48 Neither does it matter whether the candidate
practice is integral to the claimant community’s distinctive culture today, as long
as the courts conclude that it was integral at the time of contact. If the Crown
wants to allege that the rights have subsequently been lost (other than by
voluntary surrender by treaty), it has to prove legislative extinguishment prior to
the enactment of section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982.49 Extinguishment
would require legislation displaying a clear and plain intention to extinguish,50
just as extinguishment of customary and other legal rights in England requires
unambiguous legislation.51 If the view of the dissenting justices had prevailed,
on the other hand, sufcient informal interference with integral Indigenous
practices “at the hands of colonizers,” though wholly insufcient as evidence of
extinguishment, probably would have doomed otherwise meritorious claims of
Aboriginal right derived from those practices.

47. See the quotation in note 159 below, citing ibid at para 33.
48. Where title generally is concerned, it is not lost by leaving land vacant for long periods
of time or even indefnitely, provided an adverse possessor does not dispossess the owner,
in which case the owner’s title is extinguished by statute. At common law, it was even
doubtful that title could be abandoned, because in that case an abeyance of seisin (possession
entailing a title) would result, which the common law abhorred. As Sir Frederick Pollock and
Frederic William Maitland wrote, “It seems very doubtful whether a man could (or can) get
rid of a seisin once acquired, except by delivering seisin to some one else.” See Te History
of English Law Before the Time of Edward I, 2nd ed (Cambridge University Press, 1898,
reissued 1968) II at 54, n 2. See also Kent McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title (Clarendon
Press, 1989) 63.
49. See generally Van der Peet, supra note 3 at para 28, Lamer CJ (stating that “[s]ubsequent to
s. 35(1) [of the Constitution Act, 1982] aboriginal rights cannot be extinguished and can
only be regulated or infringed consistent with the justifcatory test laid out by this Court in
Sparrow”). Tis was afrmed by McLachlin CJ in Mitchell, supra note 33 at para 11.
50. See R v Sparrow, [1990] 1 SCR 1075 at 1099 [Sparrow]; Gladstone, supra note 32 at paras
31-38; Delgamuukw, supra note 21 at para 180.
51. Halsbury’s Laws of England, vol 12(1), Custom and Usage, “Extinguishment of Custom”
at para 646 (4th ed reissue). For detailed discussion, see Kent McNeil, “Extinguishment
of Aboriginal Title in Canada: Treaties, Legislation, and Judicial Discretion” (2002) 33
Ottawa L Rev 301.
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III. SECTION 35(1) RIGHTS AND COMMON LAW
ABORIGINAL RIGHTS
Section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 did not create Aboriginal rights;
instead, it provided constitutional protection to pre-existing rights by recognizing
and afrming them.52 As Chief Justice Lamer afrmed in Van der Peet, “aboriginal
rights existed and were recognized under the common law.”53 In Desautel, the
Crown argued that, “while Mr. Desautel cannot have a s. 35(1) Aboriginal right,
because he is not a member of an Aboriginal people of Canada, he can still have
common law Aboriginal rights, albeit these rights would not constitute a defence
to the regulatory charges against him.”54 Justice Rowe, while not dismissing the
possibility that some Indigenous groups could have common law Aboriginal
rights,55 said this would “introduce additional difculties” because, “[i]n
particular, the Crown seems to assume that the test for a common law Aboriginal
right would be the same as the test for a s. 35(1) Aboriginal right, that is, the Van
der Peet test. But this is far from clear.”56 He went on to explain:
Before 1982, common law Aboriginal rights were recognized in Canada under
British imperial law (Calder, at pp. 328 and 402; Mitchell, at paras. 62-64). Under
the imperial doctrine of succession, when Britain took possession of a new territory,
the laws in force in that territory were presumed to continue (subject to some
exceptions). Tis doctrine was not limited to practices, traditions or customs that
were “integral to the distinctive culture” of the Aboriginal people, as in Van der Peet.
Tis suggests, on the one hand, that the test for a common law right may be met
even where the Van der Peet test is not.57

In other words, although pre-existing rights in Indigenous law became
enforceable as common law rights after Crown assertion of sovereignty, not all
of those pre-existing rights would meet the Van der Peet test for section 35(1)
Aboriginal rights. Tat test sanctioned only rights based on practices, customs,
and traditions integral to distinctive Aboriginal cultures; not all common law
rights derived from pre-existing Indigenous law would be “integral” to distinctive
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Desautel, supra note 12 at para 34, Rowe J; ibid at para 139, Côté J, dissenting.
Supra note 3 at para 28, citing Calder v British Columbia (AG), [1973] SCR 313.
Supra note 12 at para 67.
Ibid at paras 67-70. See also paras 139-40, Côté J, dissenting.
Ibid at para 67.
Ibid at para 68. See also ibid at para 34, Rowe J (relying on an article by Mark Walters
discussing the continuation of Indigenous laws and rights after British assertion of
sovereignty). See Mark Walters, “Te ‘Golden Tread’ of Continuity: Aboriginal Customs at
Common Law and Under the Constitution Act, 1982” (1999) 44 McGill LJ 711.
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Aboriginal cultures in the sense understood by the SCC. Moreover, to give rise to
section 35(1) Aboriginal rights, the practices, customs, and traditions must have
been integral at the time of European contact, not at the time of Crown assertion
of sovereignty, which would be the time when Indigenous law rights became
enforceable at common law.58
In Van der Peet, Chief Justice Lamer ofered this explanation for limiting
section 35(1) Aboriginal rights to integral practices, customs, and traditions:
Te task of this Court is to defne aboriginal rights in a manner which recognizes
that aboriginal rights are rights but which does so without losing sight of the fact
that they are rights held by aboriginal people because they are aboriginal. Te
Court must neither lose sight of the generalized constitutional status of what s.
35(1) protects, nor can it ignore the necessary specifcity which comes from granting
special constitutional protection to one part of Canadian society.59

Later in the judgment, the Chief Justice used reconciliation as a justifcation for
limiting the scope of constitutionally-protected Aboriginal rights:
In order to fulfl the purpose underlying s. 35(1) – i.e., the protection and
reconciliation of the interests which arise from the fact that prior to the arrival of
Europeans in North America aboriginal peoples lived on the land in distinctive
societies, with their own practices, customs and traditions – the test for identifying
the aboriginal rights recognized and afrmed by s. 35(1) must be directed at
identifying the crucial elements of those pre-existing distinctive societies. It must,
in other words, aim at identifying the practices, traditions and customs central to
the aboriginal societies that existed in North America prior to contact with the
Europeans.60

58. Tese time periods can difer greatly in the same geographical area. For example, French
contact with the Mohawks at a location on the St. Lawrence River was held to have occurred
in 1603 with the arrival of Champlain, whereas the British acquired sovereignty by the Treaty
of Paris, 1763. See R v Adams, [1996] 3 SCR 101 at paras 4, 42-45.
59. Supra note 3 at para 20 [Lamer CJ’s underlining, other emphasis added].
60. Ibid at para 44 [emphasis added]. See also ibid paras 55-57. Chief Justice Lamer,
in a decision delivered the same day as Van der Peet, used reconciliation as an explanation for
why constitutional Aboriginal rights can be infringed when that is justifable. In Gladstone,
supra note 32 at para 73, he noted that:
Aboriginal rights are a necessary part of the reconciliation of aboriginal societies with the
broader political community of which they are part; limits placed on those rights are, where
the objectives furthered by those limits are of sufcient importance to the broader community
as a whole, equally a necessary part of that reconciliation [emphasis in original].

Note that the Court has acknowledged that the integral test was being applied too rigidly in
some cases and should be interpreted more fexibly. Sappier/Gray, supra note 33.
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Under the Van der Peet test, section 35(1) protects only “crucial” or “central”
aspects of Indigenous societies. Common law Aboriginal rights based on
pre-existing Indigenous law that are not regarded by the Court as sufciently
integral to Indigenous cultures would not meet the test.
And yet in Delgamuukw v. British Columbia (“Delgamuukw”), a year after Van
der Peet, Chief Justice Lamer stated, in a passage Justice Rowe cites in Desautel,61
that “[t]he existence of an aboriginal right at common law is…sufcient, but not
necessary, for the recognition and afrmation of that right by s. 35(1).”62 Tis
suggests two things. First, section 35(1) probably includes Aboriginal rights that
are not common law Aboriginal rights (this is “not necessary”), because section
35(1) rights can arise from practices, whereas common law Aboriginal rights
would need to be based on Indigenous law.63 Chief Justice Lamer acknowledged
as much in Delgamuukw: “[T]he common law should develop to recognize
aboriginal rights (and title, when necessary) as they were recognized by either de
facto practice or by the aboriginal system of governance.”64 Second, because the
existence of a common law Aboriginal right is “sufcient” for section 35(1)
recognition, rights established by proof of their pre-existence in Indigenous law
should not need to meet the Van der Peet integral requirement.65
In Desautel, Justice Rowe acknowledged that there is “apparent tension”
between common law Aboriginal rights and the Van der Peet integral to the
distinctive culture test, but, given his conclusion that Mr. Desautel has a section
35(1) Aboriginal right under the Van der Peet test, he found it unnecessary to say
more about it.66 Tis leaves open the hopeful possibility that, in a future case,
the Court might accept that there are two sources of section 35(1) Aboriginal
rights: (1) practices, customs, and traditions integral to distinctive Aboriginal
cultures at the time of European contact (or exclusive occupation of land where
Aboriginal title is concerned); and (2) common law recognition of rights based on
Indigenous law at the time of Crown assertion of sovereignty. Acknowledging the
61. Supra note 12 at para 69.
62. Delgamuukw, supra note 21 at para 136.
63. See Kent McNeil & David Yarrow, “Has Constitutional Recognition of Aboriginal Rights
Adversely Afected Teir Defnition?” (2007) 37 SCLR (2d) 177 at 210; Richard Ogden,
“‘Existing’ Aboriginal Rights in Section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982” (2009) 88
Can Bar Rev 51.
64. Supra note 21 at para 159.
65. See McNeil & Yarrow, supra note 63 at 211. See also Delgamuukw, supra note 21 at para
142 (“under the test for aboriginal title, the requirement that the land be integral to the
distinctive culture of the claimants is subsumed by the requirement of occupancy”).
66. Supra note 12 at paras 68-70.
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second source would provide constitutional protection to Indigenous law rights
that do not meet the Van der Peet integral test.67 As far as we are aware, none of
the section 35(1) cases decided by the Court so far precludes this possibility.68

IV. ABORIGINAL TITLE
Justices Rowe and Côté both acknowledged that interpreting “aboriginal peoples
of Canada” in section 35(1) to include groups not resident in Canada could
have consequences for Aboriginal title claims. Te majority held that, given the
diferences between Aboriginal title and other Aboriginal rights and the fact that
title was not at issue in Desautel, this matter could be left for another day.69
For Justice Côté, however, the matter raised serious concerns: “It would be a
remarkable proposition that a foreign group could hold constitutionally protected
title to Canadian territory, as the required incidental mobility right would be
fundamentally incompatible with Canadian sovereignty.”70 Tese concerns were
another reason for her to conclude that the drafters of section 35(1) could not
67. Recognition of common law Aboriginal rights and title could prove crucial in cases
where Indigenous communities seek to prove and enforce such rights against private,
non-governmental parties. See e.g. Saik’uz First Nation and Stellat’en First Nation v Rio Tinto
Alcan Inc, 2015 BCCA 154 (allowing the claim to proceed even without the Crown as a
party), leave to appeal to SCC refused, 36480 (15 October 2015); Tomas and Saik’uz First
Nation v Rio Tinto Alcan Inc, 2022 BCSC 15 (but for its valid defence of statutory authority,
the private company would be liable to the First Nation in private nuisance for having
interfered with its Aboriginal rights); Kwikwetlem First Nation v British Columbia (AG),
2021 BCCA 311 (federal Crown not a necessary party to an Aboriginal title proceeding if
no relief sought against federal Crown); Newfoundland and Labrador (AG) v Uashaunnuat
(Innu of Uashat and of Mani-Utenam), 2020 SCC 4 (confrming Quebec courts’ jurisdiction
to hear and determine an Aboriginal title claim against a private company that also involves
land in Labrador). Te latter proceeding has been terminated by agreement without going
to trial. See “Uashat mak Mani-utenam and Matimekush-Lac John Communities Sign
Reconciliation and Collaboration Agreement with IOC” (3 December 2020), online (blog):
<www.riotinto.com/news/releases/2020/Uashat-mak-Mani-utenam-and-MatimekushLac-John-communities-sign-reconciliation-and-collaboration-agreement-with-IOC>
[perma.cc/DF7A-QZCA].
68. Delgamuukw, supra note 21 at para 136, Lamer CJ (saying “none of the decisions of
this Court handed down under s. 35(1) in which the existence of an aboriginal right
has been demonstrated has relied on the existence of that right at common law,” but
that was in 1997).
69. Supra note 12 at paras 80-81.
70. Ibid at para 124, citing Mitchell, supra note 33 at paras 159-64. On Indigenous mobility
rights more generally, see John Borrows, Freedom and Indigenous Constitutionalism
(University of Toronto Press, 2016) at 19-49.
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have intended “aboriginal peoples of Canada” to include groups not resident in
Canada, such as Lakes Tribe of the Sinixt.71
Justice Côté’s observation that Aboriginal title claims could potentially be
brought by Indigenous groups outside Canada is correct. As she pointed out, the
Sinixt themselves have a title claim to their traditional territory in the Kootenay
region of south-central British Columbia. In Campbell v. British Columbia
(Minister of Forests and Range) (“Campbell”),72 the directors of the Sinixt Nation
Society, a representative body of the Sinixt Nation, sought an interim injunction
to stop logging in a portion of the Sinixt traditional territory in British Columbia,
pending judicial review of a licence issued by the province to a logging company.
In 2008, two years before the licence was issued, the directors of the Society had
commenced legal action against British Columbia and Canada in which they
claimed that the Sinixt Nation has Aboriginal title to its traditional territory in
British Columbia. In Campbell, the petitioners alleged breach of the Crown’s duty
to consult the Sinixt Nation before issuing the logging licence. Te injunction
petition was dismissed, mainly on the ground that the directors of the Sinixt
Nation Society lacked standing to bring it,73 but the case confrms that a Sinixt
Aboriginal title claim is at least in contemplation. No doubt other Indigenous
groups now resident in the United States whose traditional territories extend into
Canada will also be considering whether to initiate Aboriginal title claims in light
of the Desautel decision.
Te question of the rights-bearing entity, an issue in Campbell that is present
in Aboriginal rights as well as title cases,74 did not arise in Desautel because
Justice Rowe accepted the trial judge’s factual fndings that “the Sinixt had
occupied territory in what is now British Columbia at the time of European
contact” and that

71. Desautel, supra note 12 at para 125. In reality, it is highly unlikely that the drafters and
legislators gave any thought to the potential rights of Indigenous peoples whose territories
extend into Canada but who were not resident in Canada when section 35(1) was enacted in
1982. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
72. 2011 BCSC 448 [Campbell].
73. An appeal to the Court of Appeal for British Columbia was dismissed without considering
the substantive issues. As the logging had already taken place, the court decided the
injunction would serve no purpose. See Campbell v British Columbia (Forest and
Range), 2012 BCCA 274.
74. See Kent McNeil, “Aboriginal Rights and Indigenous Governance: Identifying the Holders
of Rights and Authority” (2020) 57 Osgoode Hall LJ 127 [McNeil, “Aboriginal Rights and
Indigenous Governance”].
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the Lakes Tribe were a modern successor of the Sinixt—leaving open the possibility
that there may be others….Te migration of the Lakes Tribe from British Columbia
to a diferent part of their traditional territory in Washington did not cause the
group to lose its identity or its status as a successor to the Sinixt.75

Consequently, Justice Rowe concluded:
Tis case does not require the Court to set out criteria for successorship of
Aboriginal communities. Tis is a complex issue that should be dealt with on a
fuller factual record, with the beneft of legal argument. For example, consideration
would have to be given to the possibility that a community may split over time, or,
that two communities may merge into one, as well as to the relative signifcance of
factors such as ancestry, language, culture, law, political institutions and territory in
connecting a modern community to its historical predecessor.76

In Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia (“Tsilhqot’in Nation”),77 the whole nation
rather than individual bands was held to have Aboriginal title, but that was based
on evidence of the Tsilhqot’in government structure and laws.78 In Desautel,
Justice Rowe stated, “It is for Aboriginal peoples…to defne themselves and to
choose by what means to make their decisions, according to their own laws,
customs and practices.”79 Accordingly, the title-holding entity for the Sinixt
would depend on their own laws. As not all Sinixt appear to be members of the
Lakes Tribe,80 title might be vested in the Sinixt Nation as a whole, but again,
that would depend on Sinixt law.81
So what would an Indigenous group residing in the United States have
to prove to have Aboriginal title in Canada? As with the Aboriginal hunting
75.
76.
77.
78.

Supra note 12 at para 48.
Ibid at para 49.
Supra note 32.
See William v British Columbia, 2012 BCCA 285 at paras 132-57. Justice Groberman stated,
“I agree with the trial judge’s conclusion that the defnition of the proper rights holder is a
matter to be determined primarily from the viewpoint of the Aboriginal collective itself ”
(ibid at para 149). On appeal to the SCC, the holding of the trial judge and the BCCA
that title is vested in the Tsilhqot’in Nation as a whole was not challenged. See McNeil,
“Aboriginal Rights and Indigenous Governance,” supra note 74 at 136-41.
79. Supra note 12 at para 86.
80. See DeSautel (BCPC), supra note 2 at paras 59-62. See also Desautel, supra
note 12 at para 48.
81. See Delgamuukw, supra note 21 at para 159. Te fact that the Lakes Tribe have an Aboriginal
right to hunt in the traditional territory of the Sinixt Nation in British Columbia would
not prevent members of the Sinixt Nation who do not belong to that tribe from also having
hunting rights there. However, because Aboriginal title is exclusive, unlike other Aboriginal
rights such as hunting rights, a declaration of title in favour of the Lakes Tribe rather than the
Sinixt Nation could exclude members of that nation who do not belong to the Lakes Tribe.
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right at issue in Desautel, they would have to show they are the successors (or a
successor) of an Indigenous group that occupied territory in Canada. However,
the time frame would be diferent: Instead of proving their presence somewhere
in Canada at the time of frst contact with Europeans, they would have to show
they were there at the time of the British Crown’s assertion of sovereignty (in
British Columbia, 1846 instead of 1811 for the Sinixt hunting right). Te test
for title is also diferent: Instead of being based on a practice, custom, or tradition
integral to their distinctive culture, it would be based on exclusive occupation of
land at the time of Crown sovereignty.82
As mentioned previously, in her dissent, Justice Côté expressed concern
over the possibility that Indigenous groups in the United States could have
Aboriginal title in Canada, in particular because she thought that would require
an “incidental mobility right [that] would be fundamentally incompatible with
Canadian sovereignty.”83 But why would Aboriginal title necessitate an incidental
right to enter Canada if the Aboriginal hunting right at issue in Desautel does not?
Mr. Desautel claimed no such right.84 Subject to Canadian law, individuals who
are not Canadian citizens can own land in Canada without this necessitating a
right of entry. However, if, as many have argued and we accept,85 Aboriginal title
includes governance authority, a declaration of title in favour of an Indigenous
group resident in the United States could present complex jurisdictional issues.
But comparable issues, such as the extent of Indigenous governance authority
and the application of federal and provincial laws on Aboriginal title lands, also

82. Desautel, supra note 12 at para 80. See also Delgamuukw, supra note 21; Tsilhqot’in
Nation, supra note 32.
83. Desautel, supra note 12 at para 124.
84. See further discussion infra under the heading “Sovereign Incompatibility.”
85. See e.g. Jeremy Webber, “Te Public-Law Dimension of Indigenous Property Rights,” in
Nigel Bankes & Timo Koivurova, eds, Te Proposed Nordic Saami Convention: National
and International Dimensions of Indigenous Property Rights (Hart, 2013) 79; Kent McNeil,
“Indigenous Land Rights and Self-Government: Inseparable Entitlements” in Lisa Ford &
Tim Rowse, eds, Between Indigenous and Settler Governance (Routledge, 2013) 135; Brian
Slattery, “Te Constitutional Dimensions of Aboriginal Title” (2015) 71 SCLR (2d) 45; Sari
Graben & Christian Morey, “Aboriginal Title and Controlling Liberalization: Use it Like the
Crown” (2019) 52 UBC L Rev 435. For judicial acknowledgement of Indigenous nations’
governance authority over their Aboriginal title lands, see Campbell v British Columbia,
2000 BCSC 1123.
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arise where Aboriginal title is held by groups resident in Canada.86 Moreover,
Aboriginal rights apart from title, such as the Sinixt hunting right, could entail
governance rights, given their communal nature.87 Tese matters can and should
be dealt with politically through the negotiation of treaties.88

V. DUTY TO CONSULT
Te Crown has an enforceable obligation to consult a given Indigenous
community when it contemplates conduct, or faces a decision, that,
to its knowledge, might have an appreciable adverse efect on a constitutionally
protected treaty or Aboriginal right that the community has or credibly claims.89
Troughout the proceedings, and in its written submissions to the SCC, the
86. See Kerry Wilkins, “Negative Capability: Of Provinces and Lands Reserved for the Indians”
(2002) 1 Indigenous LJ 57; Kerry Wilkins, “Life Among the Ruins: Section 91(24) After
Tsilhqot’in and Grassy Narrows” (2017) 55 Alta L Rev 91; Kent McNeil, “Te Jurisdiction of
Inherent Right Aboriginal Governments” (National Centre for First Nations Governance,
2007), online (pdf ): <wp74066.wpdns.ca/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/kent_mcneil.pdf>
[perma.cc/2XVH-F63C]. One potential diference is that tribes in the United States have
presumptive sovereign immunity from suit. See e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v Martinez, 436 US
49 at 58-59 (1978). Indigenous communities in Canada, even those with Aboriginal rights
or title, do not.
87. Te Parliament of Canada acknowledged that “[t]he inherent right of self-government
recognized and afrmed by section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 includes jurisdiction
in relation to child and family services, including legislative authority in relation to those
services and authority to administer and enforce laws made under that legislative authority”
(An Act respecting First Nations, Inuit and Métis children, youth and families, SC 2019, c 24,
s 18(1)). See Renvoi à la Cour d’appel du Québec relatif à la Loi concernant les enfants, les
jeunes et les familles des Premières Nations, des Inuits et des Métis, 2022 QCCA 185 (upholding
the constitutional validity of the afrmation of the right of self-government in the Act),
on appeal to the SCC, online (English summary): <courdappelduquebec.ca/en/judgments/
details/reference-to-the-court-of-appeal-of-quebec-in-relation-with-the-act-respecting-frstnations-inuit> [perma.cc/C6SV-S83L]. A fortiori, judicially authenticated Aboriginal rights
under section 35(1) should also entail governance authority over those rights. Such rights,
after all, belong at frst instance to Indigenous collectives, not to individuals. See Sappier/
Gray, supra note 33 at para 26.
88. See James (Sa’ke’j) Youngblood Henderson, Treaty Rights in the Constitution of Canada
(Tomson Carswell, 2007); Felix Hoehn, Reconciling Sovereignties: Aboriginal Nations and
Canada (University of Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 2012); Joshua Ben David Nichols,
A Reconciliation without Refection?: An Investigation into the Foundations of Aboriginal Law
(University of Toronto Press, 2020).
89. Haida Nation v British Columbia (Minister of Forests), 2004 SCC 73 [Haida]; Mikisew Cree
First Nation v Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage), 2005 SCC 69; Rio Tinto Alcan Inc v
Carrier Sekani Tribal Council, 2010 SCC 43.
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Crown called attention to practical challenges it would face if Indigenous groups
located outside Canada were eligible to have or to claim such rights. “From a
strictly quantitative perspective,” the Crown argued, conferring such eligibility
on “US Indigenous groups” “would dramatically increase the number of
groups with whom the Crown may need to consult and, where appropriate[,]
accommodate.”90 “From a qualitative perspective,” it added, “requiring the Crown
to consult, and where appropriate accommodate, US Indigenous groups is likely
to come with difculties unforeseen by the Court in Haida, and unforeseeable
even now.”91 One such difculty that received attention during oral argument
was the challenge of identifying Indigenous groups located outside Canada that
might have Aboriginal rights in Canada. Te majority in Desautel addressed this
last issue squarely:
Given the long history of Crown-Aboriginal relations in Canada, the Crown will
often be aware of the existence of Aboriginal groups within Canada and may have
some sense of their claims. Te situation is diferent when it comes to Aboriginal
groups outside of Canada. In the absence of some historical interaction with them,
the Crown may not know, or have any reason to know, that they exist, let alone that
they have potential rights within Canadian territory. Tere is no freestanding duty
on the Crown to seek out Aboriginal groups, including those outside Canada, in the
absence of actual or constructive knowledge of a potential impact on their rights. In
the absence of such knowledge, the Crown is free to act. It is for the groups involved
to put the Crown on notice of their claims.92

Tis is the clearest statement to date from the Court that the onus is on an
Indigenous group to acquaint the Crown with its Aboriginal rights claims.
In practice, it means that the Crown need not concern itself with Indigenous
groups residing outside Canada (or, arguably, even within Canada) unless they
have identifed themselves and their claims to the Crown.
But “[o]nce the Crown is put on notice,…it has to determine whether a
duty to consult arises and, if so, what the scope of the duty is.”93 Ordinarily,
“the scope of the duty [to consult] is proportionate to a preliminary assessment
90. Desautel, supra note 12 (Factum of the Appellant, Her Majesty the Queen at para 92),
online: <www.scc-csc.ca/WebDocuments-DocumentsWeb/38734/FM010_Appellant_
Her-Majesty-the-Queen.pdf> [perma.cc/PK3R-L6DM] [Appellant’s Factum].
91. Ibid at para 93. See also Desautel, supra note 12 (Factum of the Intervener, Attorney General
of Ontario at para 31), online: <www.scc-csc.ca/WebDocuments-DocumentsWeb/38734/
FM070_Intervener_Attorney-General-of-Ontario.pdf> [perma.cc/8269-TJ2D] (“the
cross-border realities may create uncertainty for governments as to how to fulfll their
[consultation] obligations”).
92. Supra note 12 at paras 74-75.
93. Ibid at para 76.

MCNEIL, WILkINS, WELCOME HOME 573

of the strength of the case supporting the existence of the right or title, and to
the seriousness of the potentially adverse efect upon the right or title claimed.”94
In practice, the latter of these criteria—the seriousness of the potentially adverse
efect—has been the more important. In Desautel, the Court allowed that “the
duty to consult may well operate diferently as regards those outside Canada,”95
because “groups outside Canada are not implicated…to the same degree” in the
“‘process of fair dealing and reconciliation’ which ‘arises…from the Crown’s
assertion of sovereignty.’”96 By way of example, it suggested that “[i]ntegrating
groups outside Canada into consultations by the Crown with groups inside
Canada may involve discussions within Aboriginal communities and with the
Crown.”97 But such challenges, Justice Rowe insisted, are not sufcient reason for
defeating or denying claims of Aboriginal right that are otherwise meritorious.98
Here too, we must await a subsequent case for elaboration.

VI. SOVEREIGN INCOMPATIBILITY
As mentioned above, the Crown (in right of British Columbia), throughout the
Desautel litigation, argued that the Lakes Tribe could not possibly have Aboriginal
rights in British Columbia, because any such rights would be incompatible with
the (federal) Crown’s power, as sovereign, to control its international borders.
No pre-existing practices, customs, and traditions deemed incompatible with
the Crown’s assertion of sovereignty, the Crown argued, could have survived
post-sovereignty to anchor present-day Aboriginal rights.99 “Taken in isolation,”
the Crown acknowledged, “the Aboriginal right to hunt claimed by Mr.
Desautel is not incompatible with the Crown’s assertion of sovereignty.”100 But
any meaningful exercise of such a right, it argued, would require Lakes Tribe
members to cross the international border. And “[a]n aboriginal right, once
established, generally encompasses other rights necessary to its meaningful
exercise.”101 An Aboriginal right to cross the international border is, in the
Crown’s submission, incompatible with the (federal) Crown’s sovereignty, because
“[c]ontrol over the mobility of persons and goods into one country is, and always
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Haida, supra note 89 at para 39.
Supra note 12 at para 73.
Ibid at para 76, citing Haida, supra note 89 at para 32.
Desautel, supra note 12 at para 76.
Ibid.
Appellant’s Factum, supra note 90 at para 45. See also Mitchell, supra note 33 at para 10.
Appellant’s Factum, supra note 90 at para 46.
Ibid, citing Mitchell, supra note 33 at para 22.
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has been, a fundamental attribute of sovereignty.”102 As the majority judgment
in Desautel notes,103 this submission received support from the attorneys general
of Quebec, New Brunswick, and Alberta. Justice Côté, dissenting in Desautel,
appears to have accepted it.104
Tere is, at frst blush, something disconcerting about this argument. Te
notion that nominate rights encompass incidental rights arose in response to
Indigenous parties’ (successful) eforts to broaden the constitutionally protected
scope of the treaty105 or Aboriginal106 rights they had or were asserting. Here,
on the other hand, the Crown was attempting to embed a poison pill within
a claim of right that did not purport to include it. But the SCC has taken
liberties before when characterizing communities’ claims of Aboriginal right;107
in Mitchell v. MNR (“Mitchell”), most particularly, it had insisted, over Grand
Chief Mitchell’s objections, that the right he claimed—an Aboriginal right to
bring goods for trade across what by then had become an international border—
entailed a (redundant) incidental right to cross that border.108 Tis was the
precedent the Crown sought to invoke in Desautel.
Te majority in Desautel declined this invitation. “I am of the view,”
Justice Rowe said,
that, unlike the right claimed in Mitchell, the very purpose of the right claimed by
Mr. Desautel is not to cross the border. Te mobility right, if it exists, is incidental in
this case. Sovereign incompatibility would relate solely to the issue of whether there
can be an Aboriginal right to enter Canada—an issue that is not raised here, because
Mr. Desautel was not denied entry into Canada. Moreover, this issue was not fully
addressed by the courts below. Terefore, the question of whether the appropriate
framework is one of sovereign incompatibility or infringement/justifcation under
Sparrow should be left for another day, when the Court has a proper set of facts to
answer the question.109
102. Appellant’s Factum, supra note 90 at para 48, citing Mitchell, supra note 33 at para 160,
Binnie J, concurring (in the result).
103. Supra note 12 at para 65.
104. Ibid at para 124.
105. See Simon v Te Queen, [1985] 2 SCR 387 at 403; R v Sundown, [1999] 1 SCR
393 at para 33.
106. Côté, supra note 41 at para 57.
107. For discussion, see Kerry Wilkins, “Whose Claim Is It, Anyway? Lax Kw’alaams Indian Band
v. Canada (A.G.), 2011 SCC 56, [2011] 3 SCR 535” (2012) 11 Indigenous LJ 73.
108. Supra note 33 at para 22. Te Court considered and rejected Grand Chief Mitchell’s
argument that he had no need for any such right because section 6 of the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms guaranteed independently his constitutional right, as a citizen of
Canada, to enter and leave Canada (ibid).
109. Supra note 12 at para 66 [emphasis in original].
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In retrospect, it would have been easy to establish, one way or the other, whether
the Aboriginal right that Mr. Desautel claimed on behalf of the Lakes Tribe
includes an incidental right to cross the international border. All it would have
taken was to ask Mr. Desautel or his counsel whether refusing him entry into
Canada would infringe the Aboriginal right he was claiming. If the answer had
been yes, then the Lakes Tribe’s claim of right would have included, necessarily,
a claim to an incidental right to cross the border. To all appearances, no one
posed that question.
Suppose for now, then, that the Crown (in right of British Columbia) is
correct in its assertion that any Aboriginal right the Lakes Tribe members have to
hunt in British Columbia includes an Aboriginal right to cross the international
border. What consequences ensue from that supposition?
To answer that question, we need criteria for use in deciding whether any
given interest, right, or legal arrangement is compatible with the sovereignty of
the Crown. Tat inquiry is beyond the scope of the present discussion. Relevant
surely to it, though, is the view of the (federal) Crown, whose sovereignty the
Lakes Tribe’s claim is said to have put at risk. Can something be incompatible
with the sovereignty of the Crown if the (federal) Crown itself perceives no
incompatibility?
As it happened, that was the situation in Desautel. In his written argument to
the SCC, the Attorney General of Canada did not oppose Mr. Desautel’s claim
on the basis of sovereign incompatibility; he was content to defer the issue for
consideration in a case where someone was refused entry at the border.110 Were
such a case to arise, Canada continued, the analysis should acknowledge that
Canada has, by its Constitution, limited the exercise of government powers which
may be inherent as a sovereign state. Section 35 [of the Constitution Act, 1982] is
one such limit; the Charter is another. Canadian authorities are subject to these selfimposed limitations on what would otherwise be an incident of sovereign power.111

Where imposition of federal border control precludes someone from exercising
her community’s Aboriginal right, “the framework to determine such matters
generally lies in the law of infringement and justifcation under the Sparrow
framework.”112 Where infringement results, “such infringement should be
reviewed pursuant to the Sparrow framework. Te outcome will depend on the
110. See generally Desautel, supra note 12 (Factum of the Attorney General of Canada at paras
50-53), online: <www.scc-csc.ca/WebDocuments-DocumentsWeb/38734/FM080_
Intervener_Attorney-General-of-Canada.pdf> [perma.cc/28BE-PFVN] [Federal Factum].
111. Ibid at para 51, citing Watt v Liebelt, [1999] 2 FC 455 (CA) at para 15.
112. Federal Factum, supra note 110 at para 54, citing Mitchell, supra note 33 at para 63.
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evidence in the particular case.”113 In Canada’s view, therefore, Mr. Desautel’s
claim of Aboriginal right, even if successful, posed no challenges that the ordinary
Canadian constitutional framework could not address in the ordinary way.
In response, the Crown (in right of British Columbia) might challenge
the relevance here of the “self-imposed limitation” on Crown sovereignty that
Canada says section 35 represents. Pre-existing rights deemed incompatible with
Crown sovereignty, British Columbia might argue, did not survive the Crown’s
assertion of sovereignty and so cannot exist as rights cognizable in Canadian
law. Consequently, no such putative Aboriginal rights can qualify as “existing”
Aboriginal rights eligible for protection under section 35.
Regardless of the merits of such an argument more generally, it has no
application on the facts of Desautel. It was, after all, precisely because “the
Sinixt had occupied territory in what is now British Columbia at the time of
European contact” and “the Lakes Tribe were a modern successor of the Sinixt”
that the Lakes Tribe qualifed as “aboriginal peoples of Canada” for purposes of
section 35;114 it was because hunting in traditional Sinixt territory in what is now
British Columbia was integral to the ancestral Sinixt way of life at the moment
of contact that the Lakes Tribe could establish a contemporary Aboriginal right
to resume hunting there.115 At the time the Crown asserted sovereignty over
what is now British Columbia and agreed on the international border with the
United States in 1846, Sinixt were still there in signifcant numbers, engaging
in the practice that constituted the Aboriginal right. Tose Sinixt had no need
to cross an international border to exercise their hunting right. Only those of
their descendants who became the Lakes Tribe found it necessary subsequently
to do so. Whatever else we say about sovereign incompatibility, therefore, the
Aboriginal right to hunt in the part of traditional Sinixt territory that became
British Columbia survived the Crown’s assertion of sovereignty because, at the
time the Crown asserted sovereignty there, neither the right nor its exercise
implicated the international border. Tese are conclusions the Desautel majority
could have reached on the facts as found by the trial judge.

113. Federal Factum, supra note 110 at para 55.
114. Desautel, supra note 12 at para 48. See also Federal Factum, supra note 110 at para 47.
115. Desautel, supra note 12 at para 62.
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VII.CHOICE OF PROCEEDINGS
Desautel was a prosecution about regulatory ofences. As a result, the only parties
with standing to lead evidence at the trial were the Crown (in right of British
Columbia), seeking enforcement of the ofence provisions, and Mr. Desautel,
claiming in defence the beneft of the Aboriginal right.116 Others with potential
interests in the fate of the Aboriginal right claim Mr. Desautel asserted—in
particular, Indigenous communities resident in British Columbia that included
Sinixt descendants117 and the BC Métis118—had no opportunity to lead evidence
they considered relevant to the issue of Aboriginal rights in respect of traditional
Sinixt territory in southern British Columbia. Groups representing those interests
intervened at the SCC in the Desautel appeal and asked specifcally that the court
reach no conclusions that could prejudice claims of Aboriginal right that they
might assert.119
Te majority judgment in Desautel obliged,120 but took the opportunity to
comment critically on the constraints endemic to regulatory prosecutions. “[T]he
defence of a prosecution for a provincial regulatory ofence,” Justice Rowe said at
the outset of his judgment, “while it may serve as a test case (as here), is not well
suited to deal with such broader issues [as what Mr. Desautel’s success means for
the exercise of rights protected under section 35(1)]. Such issues are better dealt

116. Because Mr. Desautel challenged the constitutional applicability of the ofence provisions,
section 8 of the Constitutional Question Act, RSBC 1996, c 68, entitled the Attorney General
of Canada to receive notice of the constitutional question and to make submissions to the
trial court, and to any subsequent BC appellate courts, about it. Te Attorney General of
Canada chose not to take part in the litigation until it reached the SCC.
117. Desautel, supra note 12 (Factum of the Intervener, Okanagan Nation Alliance at paras 1-7),
online: <www.scc-csc.ca/WebDocuments-DocumentsWeb/38734/FM120_Intervener_
Okanagan-Nation-Alliance.pdf> [perma.cc/YD96-EHED] [ONA Factum].
118. See Desautel, supra note 12 (Factum of the Intervener, Métis Nation British Columbia
at paras 7-8), online: <www.scc-csc.ca/WebDocuments-DocumentsWeb/38734/
FM230_Intervener_Métis-Nation-British-Columbia.pdf> [https://perma.
cc/2TQA-LV9V] [MNBC Factum].
119. See ONA Factum, supra note 117 at paras 3, 22-28, 31; MNBC Factum, supra note 118
at paras 10-27.
120. Supra note 12 at paras 32, 47 (deferring consideration of implications for Métis),
49 (declining to “set out criteria for successorship of Aboriginal communities”), 56-60
(rejecting Canada’s submission that only those non-resident Indigenous individuals eligible
to “shelter” under the section 35 rights of Indigenous communities resident in Canada
could beneft from such rights), 80-82 (deferring discussion of Aboriginal title and modern
treaty issues).
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with in an action setting out the right claimed, with a full evidentiary record, and
seeking declaratory relief.”121 Subsequently, he added this:
When parties are considering possible courses of action, it is useful to bear in mind
that criminal and regulatory proceedings have inherent limits proper to their nature.
In these types of cases, the evidence administered at trial is generally less extensive
and the rules are diferent than in a reference or a declaratory action.…As LeBel J.
stressed in his concurring reasons in Marshall, at para. 142:
Although many of the aboriginal rights cases that have made their way to
this Court began by way of summary conviction proceedings, it is clear to
me that we should re-think the appropriateness of litigating aboriginal treaty
[sic], rights and title issues in the context of criminal trials. Te issues that are
determined in the context of these cases have little to do with the criminality
of the accused’s conduct; rather, the claims would properly be the subject of
civil actions for declarations. Procedural and evidentiary difculties inherent
in adjudicating aboriginal claims arise not only out of the rules of evidence,
the interpretation of evidence and the impact of the relevant evidentiary
burdens, but also out of the scope of appellate review of the trial judge’s
fndings of fact. Tese claims may also impact on the competing rights and
interests of a number of parties who may have a right to be heard at all stages of
the process. In addition, special difculties come up when dealing with broad
title and treaty rights claims that involve geographic areas extending beyond
the specifc sites relating to the criminal charges.122

Tis is not the frst time (even apart from Marshall/Bernard) that the Court has
preferred civil proceedings to regulatory prosecutions for the purpose of resolving
claims of Aboriginal right or title. It did so frst in Sparrow,123 then again by
implication in R. v. Marshall,124 then again, more explicitly, in Lax Kw’alaams
Indian Band v. Canada (Attorney General).125 Why is it, then, that regulatory
121. Ibid at para 2.
122. Ibid at para 90 [emphasis in original], citing Marshall/Bernard, supra note 29 at para 142
[emphasis added in Desautel]. For further discussion of the issue, see Shin Imai, “Te
Adjudication of Historical Evidence: A Comment and an Elaboration on a Proposal by
Justice Lebel” (2006) 55 UNBLJ 146.
123. Supra note 50 at 1095 (“trial for a violation of a penal prohibition may not be the most
appropriate setting in which to determine the existence of an aboriginal right”).
124. [1999] 3 SCR 533 at para 13.
125. 2011 SCC 56 at para 11:
Te courts (including this Court) have long urged the negotiation of Aboriginal and treaty
claims. If litigation becomes necessary, however, we have also said that such complex issues
would be better sorted out in civil actions for declaratory relief rather than within the confnes
of regulatory proceedings. In a fsheries prosecution, for example, there are no pleadings,
no pre-trial discovery, and few of the procedural advantages aforded by the civil rules of
practice to facilitate a full hearing of all relevant issues.
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prosecutions continue so often to be the vehicle of choice for Indigenous
individuals or communities seeking authentication of treaty or Aboriginal rights?
Two reasons come to mind.
In the frst place, the courts have restricted litigants’ access to civil
proceedings as a means of proving claims of Aboriginal right. Te SCC itself
has precluded outright consideration on the merits of such claims in judicial
review proceedings,126 and the Court of Appeal for British Columbia has held
that actions for declarations of Aboriginal right or title are not justiciable in the
absence of some allegation of “violation of or threat to” the right being claimed.127
(Never mind that we all have some interest in knowing what Aboriginal rights
there are, and to whom they pertain.) On this view, a claim of infringement is the
price of admission if an Indigenous group wants to use civil proceedings to prove
its claim of Aboriginal right, so the Indigenous claimant had better come up with
one.128 Contravening an ofence provision believed to infringe the asserted right
is one of the surer ways to equip oneself with a claim of infringement.
Te second reason is the one Mark Underhill, lead counsel for Mr. Desautel,
gave when asked about this question a few weeks before the Desautel decision came
out, at a panel discussion about the case organized for students at the University
of Toronto Faculty of Law. His answer is revealing. Civil proceedings involving
claims of Aboriginal right, he suggested, take much too long and cost much too
much to be practicable options for Indigenous communities that have limited
means and urgent needs. In an imperfect world, test case prosecutions are often
the most cost-efective means of obtaining timely, authoritative determinations
of controversial claims of Aboriginal right.
Tere’s a paradox here. Te very features of civil proceedings that make them
more attractive to the SCC for adjudication of complex Aboriginal rights claims
make such proceedings less attractive to many of the Indigenous communities in
a position to assert such claims credibly. Tat in itself might give one pause, but
it has potential, as well, to afect the prospects for negotiated resolution of the
meritorious claims.
126. Ktunaxa Nation v British Columbia (Forests, Lands and Natural Resource Operations), 2017
SCC 54 at para 84.
127. Cheslatta Carrier Nation v British Columbia, 2000 BCCA 539 at para 15 [Cheslatta Carrier],
leave to appeal refused [2000] SCCA No 625. See generally ibid at paras 13-19; Kaska Dena
Council v British Columbia (AG), 2008 BCCA 455 at paras 11-15. See also Dzawada’enuxw
First Nation v. Canada (AG), 2021 FC 939.
128. See Cheslatta Carrier, supra note 127 at para 19 (“the defnition of the circumstances
in which infringement is justifed is an important part of the process of defning the
right itself ”).
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“Negotiation,” the majority judgment reiterated in Desautel, “has signifcant
advantages for both the Crown and Aboriginal peoples as a way to obtain
clarity about Aboriginal rights”;129 “[t]rue resolution is rarely, if ever, achieved
in courtrooms.”130 But channeling Aboriginal rights litigation into forms of
proceedings typically beyond the means of the Indigenous claimants reduces their
bargaining power in any negotiations. Where litigation is not a meaningful option
if negotiations go poorly, the Indigenous parties may well feel they have little
choice but to accept what the Crown may ofer them. Te Crown, perceiving all
this, may have little, if any, incentive to take part in negotiations, except perhaps
as required by the honour of the Crown and the still undefned, unenforced,
inchoate duty to negotiate that the honour of the Crown is said to impose.131
Private litigants, against whom Indigenous communities seek to establish and
enforce Aboriginal rights,132 of course, have no such obligation to negotiate.
Indigenous communities of limited means do have at least one option
under current law when contemplating civil proceedings to establish and
enforce Aboriginal rights. Superior courts, the SCC has held, have the option
in some circumstances of awarding interim costs to a party, irrespective of the
eventual outcome, to facilitate the party’s full participation in the proceedings.133
Indigenous parties using civil proceedings to advance their claims have benefted
from interim costs orders in the British Columbia (Minister of Forests) v. Okanagan
Indian Band (“Okanagan”)134 and Tsilhqot’in Nation135 actions, both of which
have involved assertions of Aboriginal title, and in Grassy Narrows First Nation v.
Ontario (Natural Resources),136 a case about treaty interpretation.
129. Supra note 12 at para 87.
130. Ibid, citing Clyde River (Hamlet) v Petroleum Geo-Services Inc, 2017 SCC 40 at para 24.
131. See Haida, supra note 89 at para 25; Manitoba Metis Federation Inc v Canada (AG), 2013
SCC 14 at para 73; Daniels v Canada (Indian Afairs and Northern Development), 2016 SCC
12 at paras 54, 56; Desautel, supra note 12 at paras 88-89. For discussion, see Felix Hoehn,
“Te Duty to Negotiate and the Ethos of Reconciliation” (2020) 83 Sask L Rev 1.
132. See generally supra note 67.
133. See British Columbia (Minister of Forests) v Okanagan Indian Band, 2003 SCC 71 at para
35 [Okanagan]:
Te power to order interim costs is inherent in the nature of the equitable jurisdiction as to
costs, in the exercise of which the court may determine at its discretion when and by whom
costs are to be paid. Tis broad discretion may be expressly referred to in a statute....Indeed,
the power to order interim costs may be specifcally stipulated....Even absent explicit statutory
authorization, however, the power to award interim costs is implicit in courts’ jurisdiction over
costs as it is set out in statutes.

134. Ibid at paras 45-47.
135. William v British Columbia, 2013 BCCA 1.
136. 2014 SCC 48 at para 55.
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But there are, to put it very conservatively, no guarantees. Te SCC in
Okanagan set out three conditions a litigant must meet even to be eligible for an
interim costs order. Tey are not meant to be easy to satisfy.
Te frst requirement is that “[t]he party seeking interim costs genuinely
cannot aford to pay for the litigation, and no other realistic option exists for
bringing the issues to trial.”137 Interim costs awards are, by design, a “last resort,”138
for use only where refusing them would mean “participating in an injustice.”139
Accordingly, an applicant for interim costs must
explore all other possible funding options. Tese include, but are not limited to,
public funding options like legal aid and other programs designed to assist various
groups in taking legal action. An advance costs award is neither a substitute for, nor
a supplement to, these programs. An applicant must also be able to demonstrate that
an attempt, albeit unsuccessful, has been made to obtain private funding through
fundraising campaigns, loan applications, contingency fee agreements and any other
available options.140

And unless it is obvious that a First Nation lacks the wherewithal to meet the
estimated costs of its litigation,141 it bears the onus of demonstrating in detail
its impecuniosity. Having access to resources that seem sufcient to fund the
litigation is not necessarily fatal to a First Nation’s application for interim costs;
the First Nation may have “pressing needs”142 that leave it with too few resources,
after meeting those needs, to continue participating in the proceedings.143 When
this is so, however, “it must demonstrate that those resources are in fact being
devoted to addressing those pressing needs.”144 To satisfy itself more generally that
such a First Nation meets this frst requirement, “[t]he court must be able to (1)
identify the applicant’s pressing needs; (2) determine what resources are required
to meet those needs; (3) assess the applicant’s fnancial resources; and (4) identify
the estimated costs of funding the litigation.”145 Te applicant First Nation,
therefore, must share with the court its litigation plan146 and provide extensive
137. Okanagan, supra note 133 at para 40.
138. Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v Canada (Commissioner of Customs and Revenue), 2007
SCC 2 at paras 36, 41, 71, 73 [Little Sisters]; Anderson v Alberta, 2022 SCC 6 at paras 23,
37, 38, 50 [Anderson].
139. Little Sisters, supra note 138 at para 5; Anderson, supra note 138 at paras 21, 23.
140. Little Sisters, supra note 138 at para 40. See also Anderson, supra note 138 at para 50.
141. See Anderson, supra note 138 at paras 47-48.
142. Ibid at paras 4, 43-44.
143. Ibid at paras 4, 40.
144. Ibid at para 46.
145. Ibid at para 5. See also ibid at para 41.
146. Ibid at paras 29, 68.
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disclosure of its fnancial and socioeconomic circumstances.147 Finally, lower
court jurisprudence suggests that litigants who initiate proceedings (including,
for instance, Indigenous plaintifs seeking declarations of Aboriginal right) may
fnd it more difcult to satisfy this requirement than those “thrust into a situation
requiring litigation”148 (such as individuals facing, for instance, prosecution).
Te second requirement is that the claim be “prima facie meritorious; that is,
the claim [be] at least of sufcient merit that it is contrary to the interests of justice
for the opportunity to pursue the case to be forfeited just because the litigant
lacks fnancial means.”149 According to Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v.
Canada (Commissioner of Customs and Revenue) (“Little Sisters”), this test
requires something more than mere proof that one’s case has sufcient merit not
to be dismissed summarily. Rather, an applicant must prove that the interests of
justice would not be served if a lack of resources made it necessary to abort the
litigation. Te very wording of the requirement confrms that the interests of justice
will not be jeopardized every time a litigant is forced to withdraw from litigation for
fnancial reasons. Te reason for this is that the context in which merit is considered
is conditioned by the need to show that the case is exceptional.150

Te third and fnal requirement comprises three independent criteria: “the
issues raised” in the litigation must “transcend the individual interests of the
particular litigant, [be] of public importance, and [not have] been resolved in
previous cases.”151 An application for interim costs will meet this third requirement
only if the litigation satisfes all three of its component criteria.152 “Tis means
that a litigant whose case, however compelling it might be, is of interest only to
the litigant will be denied an advance costs award. It does not mean, however,
that every case of interest to the public will satisfy the test.”153
As mentioned, some Indigenous communities have met these criteria and
obtained orders of interim costs to help fnance litigation of their section 35

147. See ibid at para 41: “Detailed proof of an applicant’s pressing needs and the extent to which
they are unfunded, and estimated litigation costs, may be required to ensure accountability
over the expenditure of public funds. At the same time, it must not be prohibitively
expensive to establish impecuniosity.”
148. See Pasqua First Nation v Canada, 2017 FC 655 at para 29 [Pasqua], citing Little Sisters, supra
note 138 at para 59.
149. Okanagan, supra note 133 at para 40.
150. Little Sisters, supra note 138 at para 51.
151. Okanagan, supra note 133 at para 40. See also Anderson, supra note 138 at para 20 (where the
Court substitutes the phrase “exceptional importance”).
152. See R v Caron, 2011 SCC 5 at para 44 [Caron].
153. Little Sisters, supra note 138 at para 39.
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claims in civil courts.154 But few Indigenous communities contemplating civil
proceedings can have confdence that courts will fnd that their circumstances
satisfy these requirements. And to be clear,
these are necessary conditions that must be met for an award of interim costs to
be available in cases of this type. Te fact that they are met in a particular case
is not necessarily sufcient to establish that such an award should be made; that
determination is in the discretion of the court. If all three conditions are satisfed,
courts have a narrow jurisdiction to order that the impecunious party’s costs be
paid prospectively. Such orders should be carefully fashioned and reviewed over the
course of the proceedings to ensure that concerns about access to justice are balanced
against the need to encourage the reasonable and efcient conduct of litigation.155

Put diferently, the Indigenous claimant may well be unsuccessful in obtaining
interim costs even if it has satisfed all three of the eligibility conditions. “It is only
a ‘rare and exceptional’ case that is special enough to warrant an advance costs
award.”156 And even then, it will be prospective only; it will not cover those costs
the Indigenous litigant has already incurred prior to the interim costs award.157
In brief, civil litigation poses both doctrinal impediments and substantial
fnancial risks158 for Indigenous communities of limited means who assert
potentially meritorious claims of Aboriginal right; any prospects of relief from
the latter by means of interim costs awards are guarded. While this remains so,
such communities have reason to continue provoking regulatory prosecutions to
test their claims of Aboriginal or treaty right, despite the evident disadvantages
such proceedings have for that purpose when compared with full-dress civil
proceedings. If the SCC is serious about preferring civil proceedings to
prosecutions for this purpose, it is going to have to acknowledge and address
this predicament.

154. See supra notes 134-136 and accompanying text.
155. Okanagan, supra note 133 at para 41. See also Caron, supra note 152 at para 39; Anderson,
supra note 138 at paras 19, 24, 26.
156. Little Sisters, supra note 138 at para 38, citing Okanagan, supra note 133 at para 1.
157. Pasqua, supra note 148 at para 28, citing Joseph v Canada, 2008 FC 574 at para 27. See also
quotation in text, above at note 155.
158. Not to mention the risk all civil litigants face of having to pay the other parties’ costs if they
are unsuccessful.
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VIII.

CONCLUSION

Desautel is a landmark decision about Indigenous peoples’ rights in Canada. Its
principal contribution, of course, was to construe the phrase “aboriginal peoples of
Canada” in the Constitution Act, 1982 in a way that takes proper account of some
of the more serious consequences of colonial dispossession, despite the evident
inconvenience of such an approach for the Crown. Judicial acknowledgement of
the realities of colonization159 is itself a signifcant step towards reconciliation.
But Desautel is important for other reasons as well. It confrms that what really
matters for purposes of the Van der Peet test is what was integral to the ancestral
community’s pre-contact way of life, not, or only derivatively, what is integral
to the claimant community’s way of life today. It rejects the contention that the
viability of an Aboriginal right today depends on continuity in the right’s exercise.
Continuity requires, in essence, only that the claimant group be a successor of
the ancestral community and that the contemporary practice be recognizable as
a version of the integral ancestral practice. It opens the door to further discussion
of the existence and constitutional status of common law Aboriginal rights
(whatever those turn out to be), irrespective, perhaps, of whether such rights can
meet the Van der Peet test. And it demonstrates the SCC’s disinclination, despite
several provinces’ entreaties that it do so, to look for occasions to invoke the
doctrine of sovereign incompatibility to foreclose altogether certain credible but
inconvenient claims of Aboriginal right.
Te Desautel court left unresolved a number of issues that it acknowledged
were bound to arise in the wake of this decision. Tese include, among others:
the eligibility of non-resident Métis groups to claim Aboriginal rights in Canada;
the availability, or not, of Aboriginal title to Indigenous groups no longer resident
159. See in particular, Desautel, supra note 12 at para 33. Tere, Justice Rowe, after observing that
the “displacement of Aboriginal peoples as a result of colonization is well acknowledged,”
quoted with approval this passage from the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples:
Aboriginal peoples were displaced physically – they were denied access to their traditional
territories and in many cases actually forced to move to new locations selected for them by
colonial authorities. Tey were also displaced socially and culturally, subject to intensive
missionary activity and the establishment of schools – which undermined their ability to pass
on traditional values to their children, imposed male-oriented Victorian values, and attacked
traditional activities such as signifcant dances and other ceremonies. In North America they
were also displaced politically, forced by colonial laws to abandon or at least disguise traditional
governing structures and processes in favour of colonial-style municipal institutions.

Canada, Looking Forward, Looking Back, vol 1 (Ottawa: Canada Communication Group,
1996) at 132. See also Desautel (BCCA), supra note 11 at para 62.
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in Canada; and the nature and scope of the Crown’s constitutional consultation
obligations to non-resident Indigenous communities that have, or credibly claim,
Aboriginal rights in Canada. Te existence of so many unresolved issues in a
single case reveals how much work is left to be done as the SCC continues to
grapple with the complex matters involved in determining the constitutional
rights of the Indigenous peoples and in seeking to clarify the relationship between
the Canadian state and the original inhabitants of this country.

